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NEGOTIATING A COMMERCIAL "MOST FAVORED NATION" 
CLAUSE 
Stirling Adams * 
The business lawyer's role in evaluating and negotiating a commercial 
"most favored nation" (MFN) commitment is to maximize its potential benefits 
to the client and to eliminate its potential pitfalls. This article discusses the 
specific business factors and forms of an MFN clause that can make the commit-
ment either an unwise infringement on corporate decision making or an accept-
able agreement that furthers a client's long-term objectives. 
After summarizing events from the nineteenth century British "Opium 
War" with China to show the context in which MFN clauses were developed 
between nations, section A discusses the business justifications that may underlie 
a buyer's request for MFN status. Section B explores reasons an MFN clause may 
be impractical or inappropriate due to administrative difficulties, restrictions on 
corporate decision making, or antitmst issues. Section C is a summary, in 
checklist form, of the common negotiation points that should be considered when 
dealing with a commercial MFN clause, with drafting and negotiating tips. Most 
large clients arc both suppliers in many commercial rclationships and buyers in 
many others. Much of the discussion in this article focuses on the supplier's 
perspective, but thc analyses can also inform a buyer's drafting and negotiating 
decisions. 
'Stirling Aualn, i, currcntly in-hou,c counsel for a global solhvare company. where he splits his 
time between negotiating technology transactions anu advising his company's Latin America subsidiaries. 
Stirling received a B.S in Statistics and Computer Science Irom BYU and a J.D. from the Boston University 
School of Law. where he graduated cum laude and was named Edward F. Hennessey Distinguished Scholar of 
Law. 
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1. A LITTLE INTERNATIONAL MFN HISTORY 
The first time a busin~ss lawy~r ~omes across an MFN clause while 
reviewing a supply contract, she may understandably wonder if she is reading 
one of the treaties resulting from the nineteenth century Opium Wars fought by 
') 
the British against China. In the early 1800s, due largely to British opium 
imports, China faced a serious epidemic of opium addiction. Though China had 
outlawed opium, Britain, in what historian John Fairbanks calls "the most long-
continucd and systematic international crime of modern times," encouraged 
British drug merchants to impOli it into China. I In 1839 China confiscated and 
destroyed over twenty thousand easks of illegal opium, required foreign 
importers to sign a commitment not to impOli opium, and threatened to arrest a 
prominent British smuggler. The British treated this as aggression against Britain 
and declared war. The British claimed the Chinese could only enforce anti-opium 
laws against domestic drug users and dealers: the property of foreign opium 
importers and traders should not be afTected." 
The ensuing "First Opium War" almost ended in early 1842 after 
superior British war technology led to Chinese military defeat. However, when 
the Chinese refused to reimburse Britain $6,000,000 for the illegal opium that 
had been confiscated, Britain burned several more Chinese cities. The war 
concluded with ratification of the Treaty of Nanking in late 1842. Pursuant to the 
I See 10 THF CAMflKIIl(;c HIS JOKY Of CIII:--IA: VOLUML II: LATL CII'IN(;, 1800 1911, PAKI I 114 
(John K. Fairbanks cd., Cambridge University Pn"s 197H). 
2 Jel. at 187 88; JACK BlH'IIIN(i, TIlE CHI:--IESE OPIl'M W~RS 77 81 (Hutchinson & Co. 1977). A 
potential modern day equivalent to this would be for Colombia to claim that the United States could not interdict 
shipments of cocaine imported into the U.S.; instead, the U.S. could only exercise ib police powers against 
domestic cocaine users and dealers. 
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tenns of treaty China paid $21,000,000 to Britain, ceded the island of Hong Kong 
to British rule, and, importantly for our purposes, granted Britain "most favored 
nation" trading status. 
On the last point, the treaty's MFN clause stated that if the Chinese were 
to grant any trading privileges or immunities to any subjects of non-British 
foreign countries, "the same privileges and immunities will be extended to and 
enjoyed by British Subjects .... ".1 In drafting this clause, the British drew on a 
feature of treaty negotiation they had utilized for at least four centuries.~ 
In 1844, under threat from a U.S. warship, the Chinese signed the 
Wangxia Treaty with the United States.' Weeks later the French extracted the 
Whampoa Treaty using leverage from the threat of eight French warships. These 
two treaties contained trade privileges similar to those gained by Britain in the 
Treaty of Nanking, including an MFN clause, and even a provision granting 
foreign nationals immunity from Chinese law. 6 
What does the First Opium War and the resulting MFN clauses forced on 
China have to do with a lawyer's review of a supply contract? More than one 
might initially think. The MFN clauses pushed on nineteenth century China had 
3 Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue, Oct. X, I X43, P.R.C.-U.K., art. VIII. This "Supplementary 
Treaty" was an amendment to the Treaty of Nanking. 
4 See Akiko Yanai. The FUllctioll of fhe MFN Claus!! ill IllI! Globlll Tradillg 5rsfem (IDE APEC 
Study Ctr., Working Paper Series 01102 No.3, Mar. 20(2) (describing an MFN clause in a treaty between 
England and Bourgogne in 1417) (ll'illlhI!! (/1 htlp:llwww.ide.gojp/Japanese/Publish/Apec/pdt/apec 13 wp3.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 2X, 2(05). 
5 Hongshan Li, MlIlIlIgillg Diploll/lllic Crisis Il'ilh Educilliollill Exchange: COI'(TIIII/<'1/1 (11,,1 Us.-
Chillil Cllllllmi RefllliollS, 1!J()5 1!J50, Paper delivered at the 16th International Congress of Historical 
Sciences, Aug. 25 -Sept. I, 19X5 at 3 7 (19H5). III http://www.osI02000.uio.no/program/papcrs/sI6/sI6-
hongshanli.pdf (last visited Jan. 2R, 20(5). 
6 Sue Gronewold, Thl' Opillm /1'ill' IIl1d Forl'igll Ellcl'OlIcllllll'lIl (1977), {I/ http://atc.easia. columbia. 
edu/china/modern/opiulll.htm (iast visited Jan. 2X, 20(5): .I'l'l' also BFECHIMi, sllpra note 2, at 172--74 (detailing 
the background to these treaties in greater depth). 
81 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
much thc same goal as today's commercial contract MFN clause: the party asking 
for MFN status demands that it be guaranteed pricing or other privileges at least 
as good as those the other party offers to any third party. Some historians refer to 
the treaties resulting from the First Opium War as the "Unequal Treaties,"7 and 
the Chinese came to refer to the Treaty of Nanking as a "national humiliation."x 
The treaty severely diminished China's right of sovereign rule in its own 
territory; for example, China was limited in its ability to alter tariffs,4 and it could 
not even control importation of illegal drugs. Similarly, without care in negotia-
tion, a commercial MFN clause can become an "unequal contract," a "corporate 
humiliation," and can diminish a client's ability to control its own business 
operations. 
Of course, an MFN clause is not always a unilateral provIsIon forced 
onto a weaker entity by a dominant party. As an example of this, the current 
standard in international trade agreements is that an M FN clause's obligations 
and benefits arc reciprocal. An early instance of this is the 1654 treaty between 
Great Britain and Sweden, which stipulated that each country's citizens would 
enjoy the same privileges while in the other country "as any other foreigner at 
present doth, or hereafter shall enjoy there."11i In the 1940s, as paJi of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), dozens of countries agreed to grant 
MFN status regarding tariffs to signing countries; they simultaneously received 
7 See. e.g., TilL CAMIlRJ[)(iic HIS lORY 01 ('IIINA. s"pm note I. at eh. 5. 
8 See, e.g .. PETlR WARD "\Y. Til[ 01'11:\1 WAR, 1840 1842: BARIl.\RIANS I:--J 1111· CElI'SIIAL hll'lRf 
IN THE EARLY PART OF TilE NINI' lH'N fll ('EN lUln AND Till' WAR llY WHICH THl'Y FORCHl HER (jAILS AJAR xiv 
(Univ. ofN.C. Press, rev. cd. 1998). 
9 The treaty with the U.S. even stated that China could not raise its import duties without U.S. 
permission. Sec LI, s"pm note 5. 
10 See Yanai, slipra note 4, at 3. 
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MFN status from the other signing countries. The GATT's successor is the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and in 200 I China, once victimized by forced unilat-
eral MFN clauses, willingly signed onto the WTO's mutual MFN obligations. As 
of Cambodia's joining in October 2004, 148 countries have joined the WTO, 
thereby signing up to reciprocal MFN commitments and benefits. I I 
II. EVALUATING AND NEGOTIATING A COMMERCIAL MFN CLAUSE 
The following MFN clause was proffered by a large financial services 
company to a telecommunications hardware supplier. In it the buyer sought an 
MFN commitment that would apply broadly to any sales by the supplier to other 
customers, or even to distributors. 
Most Favored Customer. Supplier warrants that the prices 
offered to Buyer are no less favorable than any terms currently 
agreed to or that will be agreed to by Supplier with any other 
customer or distributor. If during the Agreement Supplier or any 
of its distributors enters into an agreement with any other 
customer that contains more favorable pricing than is provided 
hereunder, then this Agreement shall be deemed amended to 
provide Buyer such more favorable pricing on a retroactive 
basis. To ensure compliance, Buyer may bi-annuallY audit 
Supplier's records upon 7 days written notice. Supplier will 
reimburse Buyer retroactively for the savings Buyer should have 
received but for Buyer's failure to comply with this clause. 11 
II For details on the number of WTO members and the dates of China's and Nepal's membership, 
see http://,,,,,,,wto.mg. (last visited Apr, 27, 2(0)), In 199R, U ,S, government trade agencies began using the 
term "Normal Trade Relations" (NTR) status instead of"MFN status," The stated reason "as that since a large 
majority of U,S, trading partners had MFN status, it was more accurate to use the NTR terln, See U,S, 
TREASIIRY, N()R~tAI. TRADe RFI.A1IOt-;S, (/, hllp:!lwww.itds,treas.gov/mtil.html (last visited Apr. 27, 20(5),An 
unstated reason t,)r the name change was that some U,S, legislators had ditliculty granting "most favored 
nation" status to communist China; ironic, given that the U,S, pressured China into granting the U,S, MFN 
status 150 years earlier. See .I'llpru text accompanying note 5, 
12 These clauses arc used with permission of the supplier, who requested that the companies' names 
be withheld, 
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For the business reasons explained below, this clause is 110t representative of the 
content of most MFN clauses found in commercial contracts today. In this partic-
ular situation, an MFN clause was agreed to by the parties, but the final text 
matched the following: 
Most Favored Customer. Supplier walTants that the prices under 
this agreement are equal to or less than standard prices offered 
by Supplier generally to similarly situated customers contracting 
for similar volumes under the same terms and conditions. 13 
The discussion below analyzes the business context and negotiation 
factors counsel should consider in either modifying or completely avoiding a 
proposed MFN clause, with the assumption that at the end of a negotiation the 
client's situation should more closely match that ofWTO-member China in 200 I 
than the MFN-victimized China of 1842. 
When negotiating an MFN or othcr relatively unfamiliar contract clause, 
it is helpful for the lawyer to collect some intelligence regarding the purpose, 
impact, and business context of the clause, particularly when she may not be 
completely familiar with business and contracting practices within the client's 
industry. This often means reviewing contracts in which the same or other 
companies have addressed similar issues. The discussion that follows uses text 
from actual commercial contracts. Several websites provide easy access to, and 
searching capability within, thousands of contracts that public companies have 
included as part of filings before the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
13 !d. 
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and thousands more contracts are available 111 other private and govemment 
contract archives.l~ 
A. Examining the Potential Business Just(jicationsfor all MFN 
Before negotiating specific clements of a buyer-proposed MFN clause, 
the supplier's lawyer should first ask whether any MFN clause would be 
appropriate given the proposed business relationship. In some situations, the 
answer may be obvious. For nineteenth century China, the objective in accepting 
the MFN-Iaden Unequal Treaties was to avoid ransacking and pillaging by the 
British, the Americans, and the French. ls When reviewing an MFN clause today, 
the lawyer should at least understand the business context at hand; does the 
relationship between the parties justify an MFN commitment? Tn many circum-
stances, the best negotiation result is complete exclusion of an MFN clause. 
14 Conlracls conlained in SEC filing:s (redacled of those paris Ihat a tiling company designates as 
confidcntial) arc mailable at hltp:/iwww.sec.gov/cgi-bin/srch-edgar (last visited Apr. 27. 2005). It can be time 
consuming to locate a contract on this website without a specitic company and tiling date or document type. 
Findlaw.com is one of several web sites that has also published many tiled contracts from the SEC database and 
organized them by industry and contract type. and these arc available at http://contracts.corporate.tindlaw.com/ 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2(05). The University of Missouri's Contracting and Organizations Research Institute 
makes available over 22,000 contracts. mostly extracted ti'om the SEC database, and these are available at 
http://cori.missouri.edui (last visited Apr. 27, 20(5). Three government procurement sites that provide access to 
many contracts between state agencies and private suppliers arc: http://ww\V.ogs.state.ny.us/purchase (New 
York) (last visited Apr. 27.20(5). http://procure.ohio.gov/ proc/index.asp (Ohio) (last visited Apr. 27. 2(05), 
and http://fcn.state.tl.us/stcontracts (Florida) (last visited Apr. 27. 20(5). 
15 In 1840 the British publication the Illdia Gil~~lfe described a British attack on the city of Chou-
san as fl)lIows: 
A more complete pillage could not be conceived than took place. Every house was 
broken open. every drawer and box ransacked, the streets strewn with fragments of 
fiJrniture. pictures. tables. chairs. grain of all sorts the whole set otT by the dead or the 
living bodies of those who had been unable to leave the city from the wounds received 
ti'om our merciless guns .... The plunder ceased only when there was nothing to take or 
destroy. 
BHCHI!'JCi, .I'llI'm note 2. at 116, citing the India Ga::eI/('. Jack !leeching. in Tm CHI!'JCSE OPlll~l WARS. refers 
to this incident and writes: "This was the occasion atkr which the Hindi word III/ previously used in an 
English tlJflll only hesitantly. and with inverted commas - became tinllly established in the language, as 100/." 
Id 
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The following, roughly ordered by both frequency and importance, are 
the most common business justifications given for a buyer seeking an MFN 
clause: 
I. Buyer :\. volume commitment 
A buyer's commitment to purchase a large volume can lead to an 
accompanying request for an MFN commitment. A buyer might tell a supplier, 
essentially, "I will be your largest customer and buy more from you than any 
other customer. Therefore, I deserve to be guaranteed your best price." An 
example of how this concept can play out in an MFN clause comes from a 2001 
Microsoft agreement to provide Expedia digital map services: 
Most Favored Nation. Microsoft will not charge Expcdia a price 
for Services rendered under this Agreement . . . that is less 
favorable than the rates charged ... to any third party unless 
such third party agrees to use MapPoinLNet Maps more 
frequently than Expedia's then current actual usage of 
MapPoint.Net Maps.11l 
The justification for the clause was Expedia's usage volume; consequently, the 
MFN obligation did not apply where Microsoft contracted with a customer that 
made a greater volume commitment. Similarly, in contracting with Hewlett 
Packard for computer systems, Ncw York Statc obtained an MFN commitmcnt 
that only applied when HP sold to a third party "substantially the same or a 
smaller quantity of a com mod ity." 17 
16 AMENDED At\Jl RESTATED MAP Sf,RVI·.R liCLNSF A(iRFlMcN r Hfc I\I'ITN MICROSOFT CORPORAl 10'1 
AND EXPrDIA. \""., cl. 4.3 (Aug. 15, 20(1). hllp://colltracts.corporate.filldlaw.coilliagreeill 
cllts/cxpedia:ll1stt.ll1ap.200 I.O~.15.htIl11 (last visited .Iall. 2X, 20(5). 
17 HEIILLrr PACKAIW - S\SII,MS 11t\J) PlRIPlllcRALS COt\IR.\CI (July 20,199-+), 
http://www.ogs.state.lly.usipurchasc/slltiawardllotesI75006533eprices.htll1(lastvisited.lall. 2X, 20(5) (the 
contract was originally signed between the state of New York and Compaq). 
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2. Dominant hargaining position 
A related justification is based partly in simple, brute economic force. A 
large buyer may have the economic clout to tell a supplier, "If you don't <fgree to 
give us your best prices, we won't buy from you." This negotiating stance is more 
likely to occur with large governments or companies with centralized purchasing 
organizations. As an example, the State of Ohio's purchasing office includes the 
following "Economic Price Adjustment" clause in its standard language for 
contracting directly with suppliers: 
The State will be entitled to a price decrease any time the 
Contractor or any of its distributors sells a product or a service 
to any similarly situated most favored customer for less than the 
price agreed to between the State and the Contractor under this 
Contract. I x 
Even if unstated, a usual assumption behind a large buyer's request for 
special pricing treatment is that the supplier will be significantly benefited by 
entering into a direct supply contract with the customer's purchasing office. Once 
the contract is in place, the assumption is that the suppl ier will have easier selling 
access to the hundreds of individual subsidiaries or office locations of a company 
or the many agencies or municipalities of a government. The supplier's attorney 
needs to understand this assumption: it may not be valid in many situations. To 
start with, much of the buycr's purchasing potential may be exhausted by the 
transaction at hand. In addition, even if the buying company is sufficiently large, 
with many potential purchasing locations, an MFN clause may be irrelevant to 
IX SIAII 01 01110 ()lrARr~lr'Jl OF A"~II'JISIRA"\'I Sl R"IUS. Snrr TFRM SCIII·mILie S&LG-
B.\SFD. Economic Pricc Adjustmcnt cl. (.Junc i. 2003 I. http://procurc.ohio.go\"/pdtislg06-0i-OJ.pdf(last visitcd 
Jan. 2X. 2(0)) [hcrcinatlcr SIAII 01 Ollioi. 
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the supplier's ability to make sales across the enterprise if the locations do not 
share purchasing processes. 
3. Preserve a competitive advantage 
If the buyer is providing a manufacturer with intellectual property or 
other resources necessary for the manufacturing process, an MFN commitment 
may be sought to preserve the buyer's competitive advantage regarding those 
resources. A manufacturing agreement between Avanex, a.flrovider of photonic 
processors to telecommunications companics, and manufacturer Concord Micro-
Optics, Inc. (eMI) provides an example. Avanex provided eMI with the training, 
confidential information, and intellcctual property to enable eM! to manufacture 
photonie components designed by Avanex. Avanex owned all of the intellectual 
property developed or resulting from the manufacturing process and could 
therefore have chosen to preclude eMI from selling the components to Avanex 
competitors. The agreement however, allowed sales to third parties (perhaps to 
create cost savings through large-scale production). Under the circumstances, to 
preserve a competitive price advantage for Avanex, the agreement included an 
unqualified MFN clause stating, "CM! shall guarantee Avanex a [percentage 
redacted] discount to the lowest prices at which it offers Products to third parties 
... in any other agreement that may hereafter be entered into by CMI."19 Without 
this clause, Avanex would have effectively subsidized its competition by 
allowing CMI to sell to Avanex competitors-without price or other restric-
tions-components Avanex had designed and financed, and for which Avanex 
19 AVANEX CUJ{P()J{AIIUN, LIClcNSl AND SUPPLY A(;RU:\I[~I. Ex. A (May g, 1999), 
http://contracts.corporatc.tindlaw.comiagrcclllcnts/avancxiliccilscagt.html( last visitcd Jan. 2X, 20(5). 
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owned the intellectual property and other resources neccssary for their manufac-
ture. 
4. Sole-source hidding 
Many government cntities and large corporations have a defined 
purchasing process that includes putting larger buys out for competitive bidding. 
If, instead, a purchase is made after soliciting a price from only a single, or "sole 
source" bidder, the customer may argue that it needs an MFN guarantee as an 
assurance that it has received a competitive price. The MFN clause in the 
Canadian government's standard language for a sole source software license 
purchase provides an example: 
The Offeror certifies that the price quoted is not in excess of the 
lowest price normally charged anyone else in Canada, including 
its most favored Canadian customer, for like quality and quantity 
of the Software Products and Related Services. . . . 20 
Though this clause docs not guarantee that the bidder's price is less than that of 
any competitors, it provides the customer some assurance that the price is fair and 
comparable to similar sales to other buyers within the specified gcographical 
location. 
5. Rewardfor risk: lock-in and switching costs 
Where the buyer takes a significant business risk in making a major 
purchase, it may seek MFN status in compensation, particularly if the buyer's 
risk is in direct proportion to the supplier's gain. For example, in implementing 
20 sO[' I WAH, ACC)lIISI flO'J RHTRI''J( f' CI'J IRI·. RH)IIISI lOR S fA 'JIJII':(; OfFER (FOR A 
DFPARf\1IcNTAL l'JIlIVllll>\L SIANIlI'J(; 0111'1{ (DISO) FOR Till' SIIPP!)' 01 CI ASS I Sou, SOL;Rn RFQl!IRLMFNIS 
OR lIM11 H) Tf'NDERII':C; Sm fll'ARc Sf',RVlnS SOl L!1I0NS) ci. ('.2.5.4. http://sotlwarc.pwgsc.gc.ca/rfso/rfsoscc-
tions/scction2c-c.ctin (iasl modified Scpt. 22. 2(04). 
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the supplier's product or service, the buyer may experience significant "lock-in" 
due to high switching costS. 2 ! The buyer's switching costs can give the supplier 
an advantage in pricing negotiations in future years because of the high costs 
associated with switching suppliers. Thus, prior to allowing itself to be "locked-
in," such buyers may seek an MFN clause as a protection against future price 
lI1creases. 
6. Network eff(ects 
Where a buyer's purchase ofa product or service benefits the supplier by 
substantially increasing the network effect for the product or serviee,22 the buyer 
may argue that its contribution to the supplier's success is deserving of an extra 
pricing benefit such as MFN status. For example, a manufacturer with a new data 
storage technology that competes with DVD's may make a significant sale to a 
movie distribution company. The manufacturer is benefited by the initial 
purchase, but it may receive a much greater benefit when the buyer makes 
movies available to consumers on the new technology. As the number of content 
providers and consumers that usc the new technology (the "network") grows, the 
value of the new technology increases. 
21 "Lock-in" occurs when a buyer has to invest in assets in order to make use of a product or service, 
and would experience signiticant '"switching costs" if it changed to a competing product or service. For 
example, a company might get '"locked-in" to one supplier's voice-over IP telecommunications solution if in 
order to move to a competing solution thc company would have significant switching costs of purchasing new 
telephoncs. adapters. switchcs, and other hardware. training personnel on using the new system. installing the 
nc\v ~ystcm, training users or support personnel on lIsing the new sy:-.tcl11. and other logislical mattcr~. for a 
detailed discussion of when lock-in and switching costs occur. and how to cause or a\oid these phenomena, see 
CARL SHAPtRO & HAL R. VARtAN. INnJRMMtON RLLlS: A STRA1HdC GUtDE 10 I HI· NL m'OR" Eco"o~1\ 11-·13, 
103-72 (Harvard Bus. School Press 1998). 
22 A "network etTect" exists when, as with many communications and consumer technology 
products, the value of a product to its uscrs depends signiticantly on how many other people have it and use it. 
Se(' id. at 13 15, 45·-47. 173 225, For example. if you have and use email but few of your tillnily members. 
friends, or business colleagues do, the value to you of the email program is extremely limited. 
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7. Ensure ':tflir" pricing 
In multiyear contracts and in many industries where companies' 
products, business models, and pricing are subject to change, a buyer may seck 
an MFN clause to give it a level of confidence that the buyer's pricing and service 
level will continue to be competitive because it will be at least as good as the 
pricing other buyers receive. For example, in a ten-year contract for cable 
services, the town of Keyport, Connecticut, sought an MFN commitment from 
Cablevision to guarantee that over thc contract life the town would receive 
service or pricing improvements or upgrades that were provided to neighboring 
towns.n 
Most of the above justifications for seeking MFN status result simply 
from the buyer seeking to negotiate the best possible price for the contract. 
Ensuing negotiations frequently include discussions based in the specific context 
of the transaction regarding whether the agreement-without the MFN clause-
already represents a favorable price. Section C below contains suggestions on 
negotiating points for both parties regarding potential justifications for an MFN 
clause. 
B. Potential MFN Prohlems-Impracticality. COl11petitil'e Harm. Antitrust Risks 
Within the context of a specific transaction, there may be a legitimate 
reason for a buyer to seek a price benefit such as an MFN clause. However, in 
order to determine whether an MFN clause should be negotiated or simply 
rejected, the supplier needs to consider whether granting MFN status may create 
23 Doug Mckenzie. Kel'l'orl Reodl' 10 Figlzl C"hle CiOI1I, THE I~[)ol' .. May 24, 2000. at I, http:// 
indepcndenLglllncws.col11/Ncws/2000/0524/Front Page/tn4.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2(05). 
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negative repercussions for the supplier. Three circumstances where this may 
occur are when the MFN commitment creates an administrative impracticality 
for the supplier, when it leaves the supplier open to competitive harm, and when 
it places the supplier at risk of violating antitrust laws. 
1. Admil1istrative impracticality or impossibility 
Suppose the proposed MFN clause is similar to the following eommit-
ment found in the State of Ohio's boilerplate supply contract: 
Any time the Contractor or any of its distributors sells a product 
or provides a service to any customer or dealer for less than it is 
then available to the State under this Contract, the Contractor 
must notify the State of that cvent within thirty (30) calendar 
days of its occurrence and immediately reduce the price of the 
affected goods or services to the State under this Contract. 24 
For many companies, because of complexity in their pricing practices and the 
lack of control-or even awareness-of channel pricing, it would be impractical, 
if not commercially impossible, to avoid breaching this obligation. In various 
industries (such as food, pharmaccutical, and electronics) a sale to the end user is 
made after the product passes at least through one level of a distribution supply 
chain or channel. For example, a computer manufaeturcr's basic channel 
typically includes distributors, OEMs,25 and various flavors of resellers (system 
intcgrators, value added resellcrs, online rcscllers, sales agents, ctc.). 
Often, each level of a distribution channel is offercd pricing unique to 
that level. For example, a manufacturer's price for telephony software is likely to 
be different for each distributor (that may act mainly as a shipping and collection 
24 SO! STATE m 01110. slIl'ra note IX. 
25 An "OEM" i, an original equipment manuf'lcturer that bundle, another company's product with 
its own. For example, an automobile manufacturer is an OEM of the airbag it includes in its vehicles. 
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agent), hardware OEMs that bundle the software with its equipment, system 
integrators that include the software as one of many parts of its busincss telecom-
munications solution, resellers that simply sell the software in an online store, 
and-most obviously-end user customers. For each of the potential parties, the 
supplier may establish a different price based in part upon matters such as how 
much of the storage, shipment, and collection burden the channel member 
assumes, and on how much purchase volume the buyer commits to. 
All of this complexity results in a common factual circumstance where a 
supplicr may not know the prices at which each member of its channel sells an 
item. In fact, once a company has sold a product to a distributor or other channel 
member, it· cannot set or control the minimum price at which the product is 
resold-to do so would be illegal "price fixing."26 Furthermore, even ifno distri-
bution channel is involved, the number of customer contracts a company 
develops over time can easily number in the thousands or tens of thousands. 
Unless its pricing processes are centralizcd with little variation, the supplier 
company simply may be unable to track the various prices at whieh it offers its 
products. 
2. Freedom to compete The initial problem with the Ohio MFN clause example 
is simply that a supplier may not be able to comply with the clause due to the 
difficulty of administering the commitment. Another serious problem with the 
commitment is that even if the supplier could be aware of its pricing for all 
26 [n antitrust parlance such action would he considered "vertical price fixing" or "resale price 
maintenance:' an activity found to be inherently in violation of antitrust laws in an early U.S. Supreme Court 
price-fixing decision. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). This conclusion 
has been repeatedly upheld in subsequent decades. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servo Corp., 465 U.S. 752 
(1984); Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers' Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminul11, Inc., 45 U.S. 97 (1980). 
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transactions at various distribution points, in many-even most-situations the 
clause should not be accepted because it may handcuff the supplier in future 
business decisions that may be necessary to compete in the market on an ongoing 
basis. 
Typically, a supplier needs to retain flexibility to modify its pricing and 
other elements of its business model in order to remain competitive over time. In 
line with this, when the town of Keyport, Connecticut, sought an MFN commit-
ment from Cablcvision in a ten-year contract for cable services, Cablevision's 
firm response was that "we can't accept the favored nation clause. . . . If we 
agree to the provision we'd have to do it everywhere. Eventually we would have 
one rate, and our competitors can set their rates, leaving us hamstrung."27 
A supplier's need for pricing flexibility may be most obvious when 
considering its distribution model. As discussed above, the supplier will vary its 
pricing for different distribution channels, in part to reflect the different services 
the channel members provide to the supplier. If an MFN clause forces a supplicr 
to price its product the same for its various typcs of channcl members and end 
users, it can break the company's pricing modcl. As onc example of this, a 
channel member is much less likely to aggressively promote, or to even carry or 
sell, a supplier's products if thc cnd user can get the same products directly from 
the supplier at a price near, equal to, or better than what the channel member itself 
pays for the products. 
Even if the text in the Ohio clause refelTing to distributors and dealers 
were removed and the term "customer" were clarified to exclude channel sales, 
27 S(!(! Mckenzie. slIpra nole 23. 
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for some suppliers an acute problem with the MFN clause is that it applies to any 
sale to "any customer." A business reality is that in many companies sharp 
variations in pricing occur without even taking the channel into account. These 
might include tcmporary promotional priccs to introducc a product (perhaps to 
brcak into a competitive market) or to reduce inventory, or special discounts 
ncgotiated to meet end-of-year company or individual sales quotas. If a supplier 
has made MFN commitments that could force it to pass special pricing to existing 
customers, the supplier may have foreclosed its ability to address specific market 
needs with custom pricing. 
The following are some of the reasons a supplier may prIce its 
products/services differently for different customers. 
a. International sales. Some suppliers price products and services differ-
ently in different countries. A common motivation for this is that consumer, 
business, and government purchasing power may vary significantly by country 
and region. For example, a pharmaccutical manufacturer might offer a drug in 
some countries for one-tenth of the price offered to U.S. buyers. Concern for 
international pricing variation is demonstrated in a manufacturing contract 
between SCI Systems and Apple Computer. There, Apple's volume purchase 
commitment was conditioned on SCI (the supplier) providing Apple favorable 
pricing as measured by comparable purchases made in the United States and sales 
in other countries would not be considered in determining Apple's pricing.2x 
b. Sales to government, school, or non-profit cltstomers. In some 
industries it is common to offer special pricing to specific categories of 
28 "OliN lAIN M ~NlTAn 1 'RI"(; ;\( ;RFF~IFN r Illl \\TFN ;\1'1'1.1' COMPlITLR, INC. At\1J SCI SYSTEMS, I'll .• 
c!. 3.2( i) (May 3 I. 1996), http://contracts.corporatc.tindlaw.coll1!agrccmcnts/applc/scis.ll1anu.1996.05.31.html 
(last visitcd Jan. 2X, 20(5). 
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customers. For example, if a supplier makes its latest digital service available to 
public schools at a ninety percent discount (presumably at a loss), and assuming 
that it intends to keep its employees on a salary continuation program, the 
supplier needs to preserve its ability to make a profit by charging corporate 
customers more that it might have otherwise. 
c. Sales to intra-company or other cOlporate affiliates. Some companies 
offer steep discounts when selling to customers or employees within the 
company's corporate enterprise or when purchases are made by corporate affili-
ates. 
d. Sales through difFerent distrihution channels. As described above, a 
supplier's price for the samc product may vary markcdly bctwccn the various 
types of channel member~ that purchase and distribute a product. 
e. Sales based 011 voilime or t)pe ofpllrchase. Even an extremely large 
buycr that makcs no volume commitment and buys $10,000 worth of a product 
would not typically merit a commitment to receive the same pricing benefits as 
another buyer who has a multiycar, multimillion dollar purchase commitment. An 
agrcement for Linuxcare to supply Linux-rclated support to Motorola addressed 
this issue in an MFN clause stating that Motorola "shall be entitled to the most 
favorable prices for serviccs for equivalent type and mlwlle of services."29 
Therefore, the low-price commitment did not apply to sales to other Linuxcare 
customers that vary in size from Motorola's. 
29 MASTER OUTSOURCIN(i A(iREEMlNl, cI. (, (Dec. 13, 1999), http:i'contracts.corporate.tindlaw.collli 
agreclllcntsilinuxcarcilllotoroia.scrv.1999.12.13.htllll (last visited .Ian. 2X, 2()05) (emphasis addcd) (thc contract 
containing thc cxcmplary clausc was bctwcen Motorola, Inc. and Linuxeare, Inc.). 
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As most suppliers are likely to have business practices that include at 
least one of these justifications, in addition to other reasons for selling at different 
prices, a supplier should usually avoid promising one customer the best price 
offered to any other customer. With this in mind, a common supplier response to 
a request for such a commitment is to simply reject the clause, perhaps with an 
explanation of why an MFN commitment is not appropriate for the transaction. 
Alternatively, the parties may negotiate the clause to renect the complexity of the 
supplier's business model, with the supplier tailoring the clause to meet its 
business circumstances. Typically, even the largest buyers will agree to either 
eliminate or nalTow an MFN when faced with a reasoned explanation of how the 
clause may create problems for the supplier or is not justified by the business 
context. An instructive example of this is the Canadian government's standard 
MFN clause for sole source purchasing refelTed to above: 
The Offeror certi fies that the price quoted is not in excess of the 
lowest price norl11([//), charged anyone else in Canada, including 
its most favored Canadian customer,fc)/" like quality and quantity 
of the Software Products and Related Scrviees. 30 
When the government first started requesting that suppliers usc this 
clause, it did not include the italicized qualifying phrases. In response to negoti-
ations with suppliers, it adopted the above text, so that now the standard MFN 
commitment applies only to "normal" pricing (and therefore not to occasional 
promotions or other such conditions), only to sales in Canada, and only to sales 
of similar "quality and quantity." 
30 S('(' SOfI II'ARF ;\CC)IIJSITION RLFERFNn ("EN IRE. slIpra notc 20 (cmphasis added). 
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3. Antitrust 
Commercial MFN clauses have been the focus of significant antitrust 
enforcement activity under federal and state antitrust laws and in litigation 
between private parties. 31 An MFN commitment can create antitrust concerns in 
both horizontal relationships (such as among members of a healthcare or other 
supplier network) and vertical markets (such as between an insurance company 
and pal1ieipating physicians).32 One example of a federal enforcement action 
comes from the pharmaceutical industry. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
issued a complaint against RxCare and the Tennessee Pharmacists Association, 
alleging that an MFN clause in RxCare's contracts with the pharmacies was 
illegally anticompetitive. 33 RxCare, a pharmacy billing and management services 
company, filled prescriptions for patients covered by third-pal1y health insurance 
plans. Participating pharmacies were reimbursed for the prescriptions at rates 
negotiated directly with RxCare. The MFN clause stated that if the participating 
pharmacy accepted a third-party reimbursement rate from any other entity that 
was lower than the RxCare rate, the pharmacy must accept that lower rate for all 
of its RxCare prescriptions. The FTC allegcd this had a negative impact on 
31 s~~, eg., United States v. Med. Mut., No. I:ncv 2172, 199X U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2150g (N.D. 
Ohio E. Div. Sept. 30,1998) (Department of Justice (DOl) settlement that enjoined insurance company hom 
agreeing to or enforcing MFN provisions with participating hospitals); United States v. Vision Servo Plan. No. 
I :94CV02693 TP J, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20930 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1996) (in a settlement agreelllent VSP was 
enjoined hom using MFN clauses in contracts with member optomctrists). 
32 MFN clauses can raise antitrust COIH..:crns of a horizontal conspiracy among participating 
providers in a health care network "which may fi.lSter collusive pricing hy creating an ctfeclive tloor on prices 
charged by the providers to all payors ." COMMI'~IS RU'ARIlI'l(' HrARIN(;S 0'< HLALTII CARe A:-;U 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, 2003 II.B.A. SEC. IINTITRL!Sr L. 24 (DEC. 18, 20(3), http://www.tic.gov/ 
os/comments/healthcarecol11ments2/aba.pdf(last visited lan. 2X, 2(05) [Hereinatier HEARI'I('S ON HFALIH CAR" 
AND COMPETITlO'l LAW]. In a vertical relationship wherc a thin.l party payor "imposes MFN requirements on its 
participating providers," one enforcement concern may be that "in some market circumstances prices to other 
payors may be kept lip and barriers to entry raised." 1<1. 
33 !d. 
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consumer prIces because the RxCare pharmacies were discouraged from 
agreeing to fill prescriptions at a rate lower than that offered hy RxCare. In 1996, 
the parties signed a consent decrec that prohibitcd RxCare and the phamlacists 
from agreeing to or enforcing MFN obligations, and RxCare agreed to remove 
the clause from its existing contracts.34 
In United States l'. Delta Dental, a First Circuit court rejected insurer 
Delta's argument that most MFN clauses have legitimate business justifications 
and are per se legaJ.15 The court decided that in order to determine if the MFN 
clause was antieompetitive, a fact-specific "rule of reason" analysis must be 
conducted to establish whether "the anti competitive effects of [the MFN clause] 
outweigh legitimate business justifications."36 The court conducted its own rule 
of reason analysis and, relying largely on factors such as Delta's significant 
market power and the laek of any price savings to Delta from the MFN clause, it 
dismissed Delta's Rule l2(b)( 6) motion to dismiss. The government and Delta 
subsequently agreed to a consent decree under which Delta was enjoined from 
"maintaining, adopting, or enforcing any Most Favored Nation Clause or similar 
provision in any Participating Dentist's Agreement, or by any other means or 
methods."37 The MFN prohibition applied broadly to "any contractual provision, 
3-/ In re RxCarc, Inc., 121 F.T.C. 762 (1996) (consent order); see a/so Press Release, Fcderal Trade 
Commission, FTC Challenges "Most Favored Nation" Clause In Tennessee Pharmacy Network Contract (Jan. 
19,1(96), a/ httpPwww.ttc.gov/opa!l996!OI/rxcare.htm (last visited Jan. 2X, 20(5). 
35 Delta Dcnlal 1,943 F. Supp. at I R2 (denial of motion to dismiss): United States v. Delta Dcntal, 
1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~71,X60 (D.R.1. July 2, 1(97) (consent decree) IDclta Dental II], 
www.usdoj.gov /atr/eases/fllnO/IIH3.htm (iast visited Jan. 28, 20(5). 
36 See Delta Dental I, 943 F. Supp. at In. 
37 lei. 
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policy, or practice which requires a dentist to charge Dclta no more than the 
lowest fee charged by that dentist to any non-Delta plan or patient."3x 
One antitrust commentator notes that in the healthcare industry "virtually 
all of the MFN challenges instituted by either the DO] or state antitrust authori-
ties have ended in consent decrees that expressly prohibited the use of MFN 
clauses."39 He opines that "[I]f your antitrust client is realizing no meaningful 
cost savings from its MFN clause, you can safely assume it will not survive 
judicial, or DOJ scrutiny."411 This conclusion may be extreme, because it ignores 
the need for a fact-specific "rule of reason" analysis that would also examine 
issues such as the market power of the party with the MFN status, how the clause 
affects cnd-user pricing, and whether the clause creates a barrier to entry for 
competitors. A case in point was the Justice Department's antitrust enforcement 
probe of online travel consortium Orbitz in 2003. An aspect of the investigation 
was Orbitz's MFN clause, which prevented the participating airlines from 
offering lower fares to other travel sites. The DOJ ultimately determined that it 
could not show that the MFN clause led to higher travcl fares and violated 
antitrust laws.')1 
38 See Delta Dental II, 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) '171.860. According to the eonsenl decree, the text 
of Delta's MFN clause read, "'Delta Denial reserves the right to limit reimbursements to dentists to such levels 
as such dentists have agreed to accept as reimbursement !i'OIn other non-governmental dental bencilts 
reimbursement programs." 1<1. 
39 Joseph A. Martin, Alllill'llsl .-//l{lil'si.\· oj "Mosl FOl'Orell Nalioll" ClouseI' III lim/Iii Core 
COlllracls, PRIVATE AN IHRUST liliGArION NEIl s, fall 2000 A.B.A. SH. A'i 1111(liS r L., http://www.archer/aw. 
com/articles/martin antitrust.pdf (last visited Jan. 28,20(5). 
40 III. 
41 Statement from the Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate Regarding the Closing of the 
Orbitz Investigation, Department of Justice (July 31. 20(3), 01 www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press releases 
/20()Y201208.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 20(5); see o/so Mark Berniker, ./uslice C"-,ors Orhil:: ill Allli-Trusl 
I'mhe, FARiHIVERN[II'S.( '(lVI (Aug. I, 20(3). 01 http://ncws.earthwcb.COlll/bus-ncws/article.php/2243491 (last 
visited Jan. 28, 20(5). 
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Recognizing the complexity of this type of analysis, in late 2003, the 
ABA Antitrust Law Section asked the FTC to issue formal guidance statements 
to clarify the characteristics of an MFN clause and the specific market variables 
that affect whether an MFN clause would be construed as anticompetitive.42 
From the various court decisions addressing whether an MFN clause 
illegally violates state or federal antitrust laws, the clearest conclusion to be 
drawn is that an MFN clause by itself is neither per se legally pennissive nor per 
se illegally antieompetitive. 4 .l The Antitrust Division of the U.S. Justice 
Department (DOJ) similarly advises that: 
While not all MFNs violate the antitrust laws, they can, under 
certain market conditions, discourage provider discounting, 
deter innovation, and reduce meaningful consumer choices in 
health plans, either by faci litating collusive pricing among 
competing providers or by discouraging providers from offering 
lower rates or more cost-effective care to rival plans.44 
Particularly within the context of a transaction where one of the parties 
possesses significant market power, or within an industry that has received 
antitrust enforcement attention, a lawyer evaluating a proposed MFN eommit-
ment may need to master, or seek advice regarding, applicable state and federal 
antitrust laws and enforcement actions. Subsequently, a rule of reason analysis 
42 HEARIr\(;S ON HEAlTH CAR~ AND COMPfcllfiON LAW, .I'llI'm note 32, at 25. As of the date this 
article was written, the FTC had not provided any further guidance. 
43 See. e.g .. Willametle Dental Group. PC v. Or. Dcntal Servo Corp., 882 P.2d (,37 (Or. App. 1994). 
"'[Cjourts should not adopt a per se rule regarding MFN clauses, hut should carefully examine the alleged 
anticompctitive clfects of each challenged clause." U.S. V. Delta Dental. 943 F. Supp. 172. 182 (D.R.I. 1996) 
[Della Dental 1[; see 111.1'0 Blue Cross & Blue Shield Utd. V. Marshlield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(emphasizing legitimate husiness rcason Il>r MFN clause at issue); Ocean State Physicians Health Plan v. Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield. 883 F2d 1101 (1st ('ir. 1989). cal. denied. 494 U.S. 1027 (1990) (Iinding that the 
insurer had legitimate business reason for MFN clause in contracts with participating physicians). 
44 U.S DOJ. AN III RliST DIVISION, HEALtIl CARl'. TASK hmn. RECF'! r ENFORCEMENT AcrIONS, af 
www.usdoj.goviatripuhlic/health_carc/2044.htm (last visited Jan. 28. 20(5) (sec MFN Clauses section). 
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may be engaged in to determine what type of MFN clause, if any, would be 
legally permissible in the client's context. However, it may be a more efficient 
use of time to simply explain to the client that an MFN commitment creatcs on 
one hand the concern of a material risk of antitrust violation, and on the other, a 
significant time necessary to research and analyzc the scope of that risk. These 
two concems alone can discourage some paliies from making MFN commit-
ments altogether. 
C. A Checklist.for Negotiating WI MFN Clause 
Drawing on the discussion abovc, the following is a summary of the common 
negotiation points that should be considered in dealing with a commercial MFN 
clause. Part I lists factors that may be relevant in communicating rejection of a 
request for an MFN commitment. P31i 2 lists clements to consider when negoti-
ating the content of a specific MFN clause. Finally, an example is listed of an 
MFN clause that contains clarifications commonly negotiated that can make an 
MFN commitment mutually palatable in certain circumstances. 
1. Rejecting a buyer\· request/iJl· A4FN status 
A buyer usually has business reasons for seeking MFN status from a 
supplier. Where a supplier finds an MFN clause unacceptable and an initial polite 
but unexplained rejection of the clause is insufficient, it can be effective to 
address the business objective underlying the buyer's request. While the specific 
content of the supplier's arguments will come ti·om the details of the transaction 
at hand, the following key concepts may be useful for attorneys in rejecting a 
buyer's request for an MFN commitment. 
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a . .JlIstifi, the price. Explain why the pricing for the proposed transaction 
(which may have already been the subject of vigorous negotiation) is fair and 
advantageous to the buyer--without an MFN commitment. This may involve 
providing price comparisons with competitors or pointing out that the supplier 
has won a competitive bid, thus providing market validation of the supplier's 
price and quality. If applicable, it may be useful to remind a buyer that the 
volume of its purchases docs not justify additional special pricing treatment. 
h. Explain the total package. Price is just one element of the transaction. 
Remind the buyer of the supplier's other advantages (such as superior quality, 
faster service, or delivery commitments) in comparison to the buyer's altell1a-
tives. 
c. Isolating the business objective. Especially ifnegotiation over an MFN 
clause has stalled, it is necessary to identify the main reason a party is seeking 
MFN status. Once the attoll1ey understands the impetus for the MFN request, 
details from the specific context of the transaction can be used to address the 
concell1. 
d. Inability to comply. It may be impractical or virtually impossible for 
the supplier to comply because of the difficulty of administering an MFN 
commitment (i.e., variations in a supplier's pricing to channel members or end 
users ). 
e. Competitil'e restrictions. An MFN commitment may restrict a 
company's ability to effectively compete in its market. Also, in some situations, 
a supplier may be unwilling to, or contractually prohibited from, disclosing to 
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onc buycr information regarding the pI;ees at which other buyers purchase the I 
supplier's products/services. 
f Antitrust risks. An MFN clause may violate state or federal antitrust 
laws. At the very least, it may concern a supplier enough to feel that it needs to 
expend significant resources evaluating the antitrust risks associated with the 
proposed MFN clause. Antitrust risk is of more concern where one of the parties 
has a large market share, where the MFN clause has an identifiable effect on end 
user pricing, or where it creates a barrier to entry for the supplier's competitors. 
g. Corporate policy. For the reasons discussed in this article, many 
companies have established firm corporate policies against granting buyers MFN 
status. An interesting stand-otT may occur when a supplier with a corporate 
policy against granting M FN status attempts to contract with a buyer whose 
purchasing organization has a policy of demanding MFN status. That is where the 
creative lawyer who understands both pat1ies' business objectives and concerns 
earns her money.45 
45 S('(!, e.g .. STRAIH;I(' AU.IANn. ANIl MAS ITR SI'Rvlns A(,REl·.~IH\T (Apr. I, 19(9), 
http://contracts.corporate.tindluw.com/ugrecments/akamui/apple.msa.1999.04.0 I.html (last visited Jan. 28, 
2(05) (contract betwcen Akamai Technologies Inc. and Apple Computer Inc.). This agreemcnt may provide an 
example of a company simply telling another that as a matter of corporate policy it docs not agree to MI'N 
clauses. The agrcement contained no MFN clause, but stated: 
In the cvent that Akamai grants to any other party "'low price assurance" or similar type 
arrangemcnt with respect to the FreeFlow Services, , . then Akamai shall immediately 
disclose and otter such morc t'lvorablc terms or pricing to Apple, provided however, in 
order to receive more favorable prices or terms, Apple must accept all of the same 
material aspects of the terms and conditions offered to sllch third party (monetary and 
non-monetary), 
1<1. at cl. 7.1. This provisioIl sccms to provide a window to a ncgotiation in which Apple pushed hard for all 
MFN clause, but was successfully rebutted by Akal1lai's finn stand and assertioll that it never agrees to MFN 
clauses with anyone (at least regarding thc services at issLle), In the end Apple settled ttlr the above clause which 
basically says, "if sOllle day down the road you do give an MFN clause to SOl11eOl1e. you'll otrer us the same 
concession." 5'ec ill. 
104 
Issue 1 Commercial Most Favored Nation Clauses 
If the parties reach a negotiating impasse at this point, the most efTective 
way to break through can often be a frank business conversation between the 
parties' decision makers that lays bare the business motivations and concerns 
behind their positions. At the same time, it can help to buttress the negotiating 
position if the supplier's attorney has knowledge of past purchasing contracts that 
the buyer has agreed to, or, failing that, similar contracts entered into by entities 
within the buyer's industry. 
2. Negotiating an MFN commitment 
In most transactions where the supplier is willing to grant some form of an 
MFN guarantee to a buyer, the lawyer needs to ensure that the MFN clause is 
tailored to t·he business justification for the clause and applies only to sales that 
arc reasonably comparable to the buyer's situation. In line with these objectives, 
the following are common issues that should be considered in reviewing or 
drafting the text of an MFN commitment. 
a. Ensure the right comparisol1s. The scope of an MFN commitment 
should reflect the complexities of the buyer's business model. To accomplish 
this, many MFN clauses apply only to similarly situated customers contracting 
for similar volumes under the same terms and conditions. Some specific compar-
isons to be aware of arc as follows. 
1. International sales. To illustrate, the cost of a servIce 111 
Eastern Europe may be half of its U.S. cost because of lower labor costs, and the 
price of a discretionary pharmaceutical drug or device may vary by country in 
relation to the average per capita income. 
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2. Sales throllgh different distrihution channe/s. The prices for 
OEM's, distributors, resellers, and end users arc usually different. If thc buyer 
claims not to understand or carc about this, a lawycr can providc a quick primcr 
on product distribution through a channel. 
3. Volume discOlilltS. It is easy to explain to the buyer making a 
small purchase that it should not be granted a unique pricing condition. A lawycr 
also needs to negotiatc with a large buyer making a significant volume commit-
ment, as the supplier will still want to preserve flexibility to make future 
decisions. 
4. Special promotiol1s. One-time and special temporary 
promotions should be excluded from any MFN commitment. This can be 
accomplished with a reference in the clause to "normal" or "standard" pricing. 
5. Government, school, and I/oll-pro/it sales. As an extreme 
example, a company give-away to benefit inner-city schools should not force the 
supplier to offer the same prices to the Walt Disney Company. 
b. Rovard performance. Granting an MFN commitment can be as real a 
pricing concession as reducing a buyer's price by a certain percentage. Ask for a 
buyer commitment that justifies the concession: i.e., "If you [make an initial 
purchase of $100 million, standardize throughout your enterprise on our system, 
etc.], we'll offer this type of an MFN commitment." 
c. Reciprocity. Takc a lcsson fi'om thc World Tradc Organization with its 
reciprocal international treaties. Where it would be advantageous to the supplier, 
seek to broaden the MFN commitment to provide a reciprocal benefit to the 
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supplier. This can help a buyer to think more broadly about its demand for an 
MFN commitment. 
d. Audit. It is best to avoid a buyer's ability to audit the pricing granted 
to a supplier's purchasers. At a minimum, any audit clause should prevent a buyer 
from accessing confidential or proprietary information of the supplier's 
customers. This can be accomplished by allowing only a third-party accounting 
firm to conduct the audit and narrowly defining the scope of information the 
auditor can disclose to the buyer. 
e. Minimize administrative hassles. To ensure the supplier can comply 
with an MFN clause, limit the price commitment to the supplier's standard price 
list or some other metric that requires little or no extra processes to ensure 
continued compliance. This is a common feature in negotiated MFN clauses 
through references to a supplier's "standard" pricing. 
f Minimize antitrust risks. The means for accomplishing this depends on 
the context of the specific transaction. The safest path is no MFN commitment at 
all , but most antitrust risk can normally be avoided if an MFN clause is merely 
a representation regarding how the buyer's price compares to its standard prices 
or to prices given other suppliers up to that date, and does not apply to individual 
customer pricing made in future contracts. 
g. The present beats past and filtllre. If an MFN commitment IS 
appropriate, it is often easiest to administer and comply with if it applies to the 
pricing that has been agreed to in current contracts. If it is extended to past or 
future deals, the antitrust risks from the commitment increase. 
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h. Reasonable time limits. If an MFN clause does need to apply to future 
sales to other buyers, the time period should be reasonably limited. If a supply 
contract's initial term is renewable, for example, it is best to limit the MFN 
commitment to the first term only. IBM's restrictive approach as the supplier in 
a contract with Uniphase was to limit the MFN commitment to sales made 
"during the preceding twelve (12) months to any other non-IBM customer 
purchasing equivalent quantities .... "~(, 
i. CO/porale policy. Explain to the buyer the reason for the supplier's 
policy against agreeing to MFN clauses, or at least to MFN clauses with celtain 
objectionable elements. If the supplier has not developed a consistent corporate 
policy, see Sections A and B above. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The business lawyer can best assist a client in negotiating an MFN clause 
by paying attention to business justifications for, and potential problems resulting 
from, such a commitment. The above discussion argues that an MFN commit-
ment is not appropriate in many sophisticated commercial transactions. Where 
both parties agree that an MFN clause is appropriate, the commitment should be 
tailored to meet agreed-to objectives and avoid unnecessary business risks. The 
following sample provision shows the type of qualifiers often agreed to in MFN 
clauses and illustratcs the factors discussed in this article: 
46 TECII~OLO(;Y LICENsl' A(;REEMI,~ I, cl. 2.12 (Mar. 10, 1997), http://contracts.corporatc.tindlaw 
.com/agreemenls/uniphasc/ibm.techlic.1997.0J.IO.htl11l (last visited Jun. 2X, 200S) (the contract was entered 
into by IBM Corporation and Uniphase Corporation). 
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Supplier warrants that the prices under this agreement are equal 
to or less than standard prices offered by Supplier generally to 
similarly situated customers contracting for similar volumes 
under the same terms and conditions. 
Of course, as illustrated by this article, this clause cannot cover many, 
nor perhaps, even most situations. Many suppliers simply need the freedom to 
treat differently even similarly situated customers purchasing like quantities. 
Furthermore, some circumstances will justify an MFN provision with fewer 
qualifications. 
This article began with a little history of the use of MFN agreements 
between nations. The criminal imperialism of the West in nineteenth century 
China was an atrocity so monstrous that there is no real analogue between forcing 
China to grant unilateral MFN status and contemporary commercial transactions. 
Instead, the lesson to extrapolate from the international treaties discussed may be 
simply that a supplier should take care to avoid unilateral commitments that 
constrict its ability to make decisions in a dynamic business environment. For the 
situation where both supplier and buyer agree to negotiate an MFN commitment, 
by considering the concepts discussed above, the attorney can negotiate so as to 
maximize the client's ability to compete and minimize the risks of administrative 
burden, contract breach, or illegal behavior. 
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